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THE LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
NEGLIGENT INSPECTION - 1983
CHARLES F. KRAUSE*
JOSEPH T. COOK**
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
PURSUANT TO THE congressionally mandated waiver ofsovereign immunity found in the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA),1 the United States can be held liable in tort for inju-
* Mr. Krause is a partner in the law firm of Speiser, Krause & Madole, dividing his
time between the firm's New York and Texas offices. He is admitted to practice in
New York, Washington, D.C. and Texas, and he has been specializing in aviation
litigation for twenty-two years.
** Mr. Cook is a partner in the firm of Speiser, Krause & Madole and he manages
the firm's Los Angeles office. He is admitted to practice in Virginia, Washington, D.C.
and California, and has been specializing in aviation litigation for eleven years. Mr.
Cook gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by his law clerk, Scott Raphael,
in the preparation of this article.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section
1346(b) states as follows:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district
courts, together with the United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be lia-
ble to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred. Id.
Section 2671 states as follows:
As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title,
the term 'Federal Agency' includes the executive departments, the mil-
itary departments, independent establishments of the United States,
and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of
the United States, but does not include any contractor with the United
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ries arising from the negligent acts or omissions of govern-
ment employees. The FTCA, however, only supplants com-
mon law sovereign immunity in the limited manner
established by Congress. Therefore, courts have no jurisdic-
tion to hear cases which involve government activity outside
the waiver of sovereign immunity provisions found in the
FTCA.2
The limitations on the application of the FTCA are numer-
ous. The plaintiff first must make an administrative claim to
the agency which allegedly has acted negligently through its
employee(s). If the plaintiff is denied an administrative set-
tlement, the plaintiff then must plead and prove that a pri-
vate person could be held liable for the same or similar con-
duct as that of the United States. Under the FTCA, the
United States can only be held liable "in the manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances....
States.
'Employee of the government' includes officers or employees of any
federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United
States, members of the National Guard while engaged in training or
duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 of title 32, and persons
acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily
or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or
without compensation.
'Acting within the scope of his office or employment', in the case of a
member of the military or naval forces of the United States or a mem-
ber of the National Guard as defined in section 101(3) or title 32,
means acting in line of duty.
Id.
; Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 (1967) (holding that although the government is
ordinarily immune from suit, when Congress enacted the statutory scheme to return
seized enemy assets to United States creditors, it defined the conditions under which
such actions will be permitted); Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1975)
(claim for wrongful induction into the Armed Forces barred by "misrepresentation"
exception to Federal Tort Claims Act); Peterson v. United States, 428 F.2d 368 (8th
Cir. 1970) (action to recover money damages for deprivation of constitutional rights
under fourth and fifth amendments allegedly resulting from illegal and unreasonable
search of residence by federal officers was dismissed because plaintiff failed to first
present his claim to appropriate federal agency and obtain final denial thereof).
28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976).
Id. at § § 1346(b), 2674 (1976). For a comprehensive discussion of the peculiari-
ties associated with FTCA litigation, see generally, L. JASON, HANDLING FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS 1-3 (1980); Silverman, The Ins and Outs of Filing a Claim Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 41 (1979).
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Specific exceptions to the application of the FTCA are
found in Section 2680 of Title 28 of the United States Code.'
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (1976). Section 2680 states as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a stat-
ute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection
of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or
merchaidise by any officer of customs or excise or any other
law-enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-
752, 781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty
against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee
of the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-
31 of Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or estab-
lishment of a quarantine by the United States.
[(g) Repealed. Sept. 26, 1950, ch. 1049, § 13(5), 64 Stat. 1043.]
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of inves-
tigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Gov-
ernment, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of
the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false im-
prisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecu-
tion. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law
enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States who
is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to
make arrests for violations of Federal Law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the mili-
tary or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(l) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal
Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank,
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One of these exceptions, the discretionary function defense,
protects the United States from claims which are "based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or employee of the government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused."' The leading cases on the dis-
cretionary function defense are Dalehite v. United States7
and Indian Towing Co. v. United States.8
In Dalehite, the United States was sued for damage that
resulted from the explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer.9
The fertilizer had been manufactured for and under the direc-
tion of the United States.10 The plaintiffs alleged that the
United States was negligent in using a material in the fertil-
izer that was known to have explosive properties and in per-
mitting shipment through populated areas.1 The United
States Supreme Court determined that the governmental ac-
tivity involved decisions which took place at the planning
level, and not at the operational level."' The Court stated that
"[w]here there is room for policy judgment and decision there
is room for discretion."' 3 Therefore, by applying the discre-
tionary function exception to the case, the Supreme Court
held the federal government not liable.' 4
a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). Section 2680(a) states as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
not apply to [any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the Government, exercising due care in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.
Id.
346 U.S. 15 (1953).
£ 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
346 U.S. at 23.
10 Id. at 18-20.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 42.
ij Id. at 36.
Id. at 15.
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In Indian Towing, the Supreme Court refined the Dalehite
position by holding that even when activity is uniquely gov-
ernmental, a breach of duty at the operational level is not pro-
tected by the discretionary function defense." The Indian
Towing case arose when a tug towing a barge went aground on
an island, damaging the cargo carried by the barge. The
grounding was caused by the United States Coast Guard's
failure 'to properly maintain a lighthouse located on the is-
land."0 The plaintiffs sued for property damage alleging that
the Coast Guard had not checked the battery for the light and
a sun relay switch and that the Coast Guard further had
failed to warn mariners that the light was not operating.17 The
government's defense was that because no private entity con-
ducted any similar or like activity, the lighthouse mainte-
nance was uniquely governmental and thus protected under
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA." The Su-
preme Court rejected the use of this defense, holding that
once the government undertakes to provide a service, the ser-
vice must be provided with due care.'
A second exception to liabilty under the FTCA excludes
cases arising out of misrepresentation." According to the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Neustadt,2' the government
will not be liable for damages flowing from any misrepresenta-
tion whether intentional or negligent. In Neustadt, sellers of a
house requested the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
to appraise their home in order to assure that FHA mortgage
insurance would be available to a purchaser.22 The FHA in-
spection disclosed no defects." After the Neustadts purchased
the home, allegedly relying upon the FHA's "no defect" in-
spection, cracks appeared in the walls and ceilings of the
15 350 U.S. at 61.
11 Id. at 62.
1" Id.
I ld. at 64.
Id. at 69.
,8 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of section 2680(h).
, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
2 Id. at 698.
3 Id.
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house.2 4 The cracks were due to shifting subsoil beneath the
house foundation.25 The Neustadts sued the United States
seeking to recover the difference between the true value of the
house, when considering the sifting subsoil and the purchase
price. The plaintiffs alleged that they "would not have pur-
chased the property for $24,000.00 but for the carelessness
and negligence of the [FHA]. '" 2 e The Supreme Court held that
the FHA's inspection and certification of no defect was merely
a representation and that the misrepresentation exception27 to
the FTCA protected the government from liability. 28
The discretionary function and misrepresentation excep-
tions to the FTCA form important governmental defenses.
The government asserts these defenses against plaintiffs who
sue in tort for damages suffered due to a negligent govern-
mental inspection of an aircraft. This article will focus on the
developing law of governmental liability for negligent inspec-
tion of aircraft and suggest practical solutions to leading
problems.
II. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT
According to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,29 the Admin-
istrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has a
duty to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft by prescribing
minimum safety standards governing the designs, materials,
construction, and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines,
and propellers.30 Pursuant to that mandate, the Administrator
2, Id. at 700.
25 Id.
21 Id. at 700-01.
,7 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
28 Neustadt, 366 U.S. at 702.
2- 49 U.S.C. § § 1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
80 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1976). Section 1421(a) states as follows:
The Secretary of Transportation is empowered and it shall be his duty
to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescrib-
ing and revising from time to time: (1) Such minimum standards gov-
erning the design, materials, workmanship, construction and perform-
ance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as may be required in
the interest of safety ....
NEGLIGENT INSPECTION
also is empowered to establish regulations regarding the in-
specting, servicing, and overhauling of aircraft and their vari-
ous component parts.31 Consistent with those duties and pow-
ers, the Administrator is authorized to issue certificates for
aircraft and their component parts and to require the manu-
facturers and modifiers of aircraft to fulfill certification re-
quirements prior to the issuance of a certificate.8
In order to accomplish the tasks set out by Congress, the
Administrator has established various regulations regarding
the certification and the inspection of aircraft and component
parts. These regulations are found in Title 14, parts 21 and 23
of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs). The thrust of the
regulations is to require that all airplanes flown with United
States registrations meet basic minimum safety standards for
design and for manufacture.
Part 21 of the CFRs sets forth the procedures to be fol-
lowed when the manufacturer of an airplane seeks to obtain
the certification necessary for the marketing of his plane.
First, the manufacturer must obtain approval of the basic de-
sign." This approval will result in a type certificate. 4 Once
the type certificate is issued, and a prototype is produced and
is shown to meet the FAA's standards, a production certificate
may be issued which authorizes the manufacturer to produce
numerous airplanes in conformance with the type certificate. 5
Following the issuance of the production certificate, each indi-
vidual airplane leaving the production line is inspected to de-
termine whether it conforms to the type certificate as author-
ized by the production certificate. Each plane passing that
inspection is then issued an airworthiness certificate.36
When a major modification or a substantial change is con-
Id.
: Id. § 1421(a)(3).
3: Id. § 1423.
0 14 C.F.R. § 21.15 (1982).
Id. § 21.21. "Type certificate" specifies the make and the basic model of aircraft,
such as a DC-10, the operating limitations, the certificate data sheet, the applicable
regulations with which the Federal Aviation Administration records compliance, and
any other conditions or limitations prescribed for the product. Id. § § 21.21, 21.41.
" Id. § 21.135.
" Id. § 21.183.
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templated in an airplane that has already been issued an air-
worthiness certificate, a supplemental type certificate (STC)
must be obtained.3 7 Approval of an STC application is usually
based upon a review of plans and specifications for proposed
change and a conformance inspection following the perform-
ance of the work involved.38 In both the manufacture of a new
plane (type certificate to airworthiness certificate evolution)
and the major modification of an existing plane (STC evolu-
tion), the FAA is empowered to perform actual inspections of
various phases of manufacture or modification. When an FAA
mechanic or engineer inspects a new or modified aircraft and
advises the manufacturer or modifier that the plane does not
meet some specific standard, the manufacturer or modifer
must correct the deficiency or fail in his quest for the appro-
priate certificate. Conversely, when an FAA mechanic or engi-
neer inspects and approves a product, that approval logically
signals an end to further effort by the manufacturer or modi-
fier to satisfy the relevant regulations.
It is clear that the drafting of regulations or the decision
not to draft a regulation covering a specific area is within the
discretion of the agency concerned. 9 Thus, the failure to have
regulations covering certain areas, such as the failure to re-
quire upper body restraints on commercial carriers, cannot be
the basis for governmental liability because of the discretion-
ary function exception.40 Similarly, if a regulation exists but
can be criticized because it is insufficient, the government is
still protected by the discretionary function defense.4 '
Some certification standards and requirements are couched
in sufficiently broad language as to permit the manufacturer
or the modifier to choose one of several approaches to meet
the requirement. 2 Similarly, some standards may be so vague
that reasonable persons differ as to whether or not a given
aId. §21.113.
' Id. § 21.115.
See Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir. 1981).
40 Id.
41 Id.
,1 See, e.g, 14 C.F.R. § 23.965 (1982) (different standards apply to different types
of tanks).
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installation or fabrication does indeed meet the requirements.
Section 23.954 of Title 14 of the CFRs is such a standard. Sec-
tion 23.954 requires the following:
The fuel system must be designed and arranged to prevent the
ignition of fuel vapor within the system by-(a) direct light-
ning strikes to areas having a high probability of stroke attach-
ment; (b) swept lightning strokes on areas where swept strokes
are highly probable; and (c) corona or streamering at fuel vent
outlets.'
When considering this regulation, reasonable persons may dif-
fer as to what area in a fuel system has a "high probability of
stroke attachment." 44 For example, in approving or accepting
a fuel system design propounded by a manufacturer or modi-
fier, two FAA engineers exercising their own judgment or dis-
cretion, as authorized by the regulations, might arrive at two
different determinations. It is the exercise of their judgments
that allows the United States to be protected from liability by
the FTCA."'
In contrast to the vagueness of Section 23.954, a substantial
number of regulations are phrased in precise and measurable
language. For example, Section 23.965 of Title 14 of the CFRs
requires the following:
Each fuel tank must be able to withstand the following pres-
sures without failure or leakage: ... (1) for each conventional
metal tank and non-metallic tank with walls not supported by
the airplane structure, a pressure of 3.5 PSI, or that pressure
developed during maximum, ultimate acceleration with a full
tank, whichever is greater.'6
When considering this regulation, reasonable persons could
not differ as to what pressure a fuel tank must be able to
withstand. If an FAA mechanic or engineer inspected a fuel
tank installation, measured the abilities of the tank to with-
stand pressures, failed to discover that the installation would
.3 14 C.F.R. § 23.954 (1982).
44 Id.
45 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). For the text of section 2680, see supra note 5.
"6 14 C.F.R. § 23.965 (1982).
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not stand pressures in excess of 3.0 PSI, 7 and then approved
the installation, it would appear that the mechanic's or engi-
neer's inspection was negligently performed.
The distinction to be drawn between the first example and
the second example is that in the first, the inspector and the
FAA knew that the regulation was not precise and they there-
fore were exercising their own judgment in granting approval.
In the second situation, the inspector, because of his negli-
gence, failed to detect a deficiency. The inspector did not say
to himself or to his supervisors, "The tank will not sustain the
required pressures, but let's pass it anyway, because it's a
good plane." To the contrary, the negligent conduct prevented
the detection of the precise and measurable defect. It is the
sort of conduct in the second example which is the subject of
this article.
III. GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT INSPECTION
As noted before, in order to establish the liability of the
United States under the FTCA, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that a private person in like circumstances would also be lia-
ble.'8 If a private person in like circumstances has no duty,
then the government has no duty. Caution, however, should
be exercised in this area. "Like circumstances" does not re-
quire that for every governmental activity an identical non-
governmental activity exist. Indian Towing Co. v. United
States49 exemplifies this proposition. In Indian Towing the
Supreme Court held that the United States Coast Guard had
a duty to maintain lighthouses in a non-negligent fashion de-
spite the fact that no private person maintained lighthouses.
The Court found that the "private person in like circum-
stances" standard is broad enough that once the government
acts like a private person and undertakes a duty to warn
others, and the others rely upon that duty, then the duty
must be accomplished in a non-negligent fashion.50
47 Id.
28 U.S.C. § § 1346(b), 2674 (1976).
" 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
50 Id. at 69.
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Recently, a federal court in United Scottish Insurance Co.
v. United States" (United Scottish I) held that in the area of
negligent inspection, the "private person in like circum-
stances" duty established by the FTCA can be met by the ap-
plication of the good samaritan doctrine.52 The good samari-
tan doctrine, stated in Sections 323 and 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, imposes liability on a person
who negligently renders a service to another when it is clear
that the service is required to protect a person or his things if
the recipient of the service relies upon it or if the negligent
performance of the service increases the risk of harm."3 Addi-
tionally, the doctrine imposes liability when a person renders
a service which he should know is needed for the protection of
a third person or his things if the negligent performance of
the service results in physical harm. Therefore, liability is lim-
ited to situations in which the risk of harm is increased, reli-
ance upon the actor is shown, or the actor assumes an obliga-
tion owed to a third person by another. 4
51 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979). Following the decision reported at 614 F.2d 188
(9th Cir. 1979), the United Scottish case was remanded for further proceedings. Fol-
lowing those proceedings, judgment was again entered against the United States, and
the United States again appealed. The decision in the second United Scottish appeal
is reported at 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982). Hereinafter, the first appellate decision
at 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979) will be referred to as United Scottish I, and the
second decision at 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982) will be referred to as United Scottish
HI.
614 F.2d at 192, 195.
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) Section 323 provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitiously, or for consideration, to render ser-
vices to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protec-
tion of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other
for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care
to perform his undertaking if:
(a) His failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm; or
(b) The harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). Section 324A provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously, or for consideration, to render ser-
vices to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protec-
tion of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third
person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasona-
ble care to protect his undertaking, if:
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A. History
Before discussing United Scottish I, several cases should be
reviewed in which the government faced potential liability
under the FTCA for negligent inspection as part of aircraft
certification. None of these decisions, however, squarely con-
fronted all of the principal issues. The cases will be discussed
in chronological order.
In Bristow v. United States" the plaintiffs sued for wrong-
ful death and personal injury damages arising from a plane
crash which occurred during takeoff at an air show." The
plaintiffs theorized that the government's failure to inspect
the plane was the cause of their injuries.57 The trial court
found that the cause of the crash was pilot error and that the
condition of the plane was not a factor.58 Therefore, the court
did not rule upon whether the United States was liable for
negligent inspection.'
In Gibbs v. United States" the district court found that the
government had a duty to conduct its inspection and its certi-
fication activities in a non-negligent fashion.61 The court fur-
ther found that the government had been negligent.2 The
case arose when a local commuter flight crashed, killing ten
persons.6 3 The suit against the United States alleged negligent
inspection and certification of the airline and of the plane that
crashed.6 Although the plane had undergone modifications
(a) His failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of
such harm, or
(b) He has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to
the third person; or
(c) The harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the
third person upon the undertaking.
Id.





'0 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
1 Id. at 400.
I' d.
" Id. at 393-94.
I ld. at 394.
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and had received an STC prior to the accident, the plaintiffs
claimed that the modified airplane was not airworthy. 5 As in
Bristow, the court found that the cause of the crash was oper-
ator error, not government negligence, so liability did not at-
tach to the United States."
The case of Rapp v. Eastern Airlines6 7 arose from the crash
of an Eastern Airlines Electra following the ingestion of birds
into the engines during takeoff."' The case against the govern-
ment was based upon the fact that the government had issued
a type certificate for the airplane attesting to the airworthi-
ness of the plane. 9 The plaintiffs asserted that the govern-
ment knew, or should have known, that the plane's engines
were capable of ingesting birds on takeoff, and the plane was
therefore, not airworthy.70 Although the trial court found in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the United States, the mat-
ter was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. While the appeal was pending, the United
States settled the case, and as a condition to that settlement,
the Third Circuit entered an order vacating the judgment be-
low. 71 The final result is that while Rapp is of limited value as
authority for the proposition that the government has a duty
to inspect in a non-negligent fashion, the government was suf-
ficiently concerned about the issue to settle the case pending
appeal and to insist upon an order vacating the judgment
below.72
" Id. at 395.
" Id. at 400.
' 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
I d. at 675.
69 Id. at 676.
70 Id. at 679.
7- 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1970).
72 The Rapp case has led a tortured life, and the district court decision has occa-
sionally been incorrectly cited as having been affirmed on appeal. See, e.g., Arney v.
United States, 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1973). The confused aspect of the case's
history springs from the fact that another appeal from the same complex trial was
taken under the name of Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, 339 F.2d 14 (3d .Cir.), cert de-
nied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968). That case was affirmed by the Third Circuit on issues
totally unrelated to negligent inspection and certification. Unfortunately, the Shep-
pard citator lists the Scott case as an affirmance of the Rapp decision.
19831
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Marivale, Inc. v. Planes, Inc." involved the buyer and seller
of a Cessna 310 aircraft. The buyer asserted against the seller
the theories of fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of
warranties.7 4 The seller brought a third-party action against
the United States, alleging reliance upon a federal airworthi-
ness certificate and claiming that if the plane were indeed as
bad as the purchaser claimed, the government inspection
should have detected the problem areas." The court, distin-
guishing between a claim for negligent certification and a
claim for negligent inspection, granted the government's mo-
tion to dismiss.7 The court held that this was a claim for neg-
ligent certification and that the misrepresentation exception
to the FTCA7 7 applied.78
In Arney v. United States7" the court cited both Rapp and
Gibbs for the proposition that the government can be held lia-
ble for negligent conduct in certification of aircraft. The juris-
dictional basis for the action, however, was the admiralty ju-
risdiction of the federal courts.80 As a result, the "private
person in like circumstances" limitation of the FTCA did not
apply.81 The case arose following the crash of a twin engine
Beechcraft after a long range fuel system had been installed.82
Following the installation of the fuel system, the FAA in-
spected the plane and issued a special ferry permit.8" The trial
court granted the government's motion for summary judg-
ment, apparently because the court determined that the
plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence and thus were
barred from recovery.8' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
71 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
14 Id. at 856.
71 Id. at 857.
7" Id. at 858-60.
7 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
" 306 F. Supp. at 860.
" 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973).
80 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1966).
8' Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d at 655.
I d. at 655.
61 Id. at 656.
6, Id. at 657.
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and remanded for further proceedings,8" concluding in part
that the United States can be held liable for negligence in cer-
tification cases.86
Although the court in In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Silver
Plume, Colorado on October 2, 1980 87 arrived at a decision
similar to the decisions in Gibbs and Bristow, the court pro-
vided a much more thorough discussion of the issue of duty
with respect to certification and inspection. The action was a
consolidation of seventeen cases arising from the 1970 crash of
a chartered Martin 404 aircraft.8 After a detailed discussion
of the facts, 9 the court analyzed the duty aspects of FAA cer-
tification in depth.90 The conclusion of the court was that the
FAA does have an actionable duty to perform certification in-
spections in a non-negligent fashion, and that breach of that
duty may be the basis for liability." In that particular crash,
however, the court found that the negligent activities of the
United States were not the proximate cause of the injuries
suffered, and thus liability did not attach.2
In Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,95 the plaintiff sued an air-
craft manufacturer for the death of plaintiff's decedent follow-
ing a crash. Cessna filed a third party complaint against the
United States, seeking contribution or indemnity and alleging
negligent certification.98 Cessna claimed that if the plane was
defective, as asserted by the plaintiff, then the government
should have detected the defects and prevented Cessna from
distributing the product. The court held that any negligent
conduct by government employees involved in the inspection
was really nothing more than a misrepresentation as to the
85 Id. at 661.
8' Id. at 658.
455 F. Supp. 384 (D. Kan. 1977).
Id. at 387. The plane was carrying the Wichita State University football team.
Id. at 393.
:9 Id. at 388-400.
0 Id. at 405-09.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410.




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
true condition of the aircraft involved." Relying on the mis-
representation exception to the FTCA,9 the court granted
summary judgment for the United States. 8
The last significant reported decision on the issue of negli-
gent inspection/certification prior to United Scottish I is Cle-
mente v. United States." In this case, the famous baseball
star, Roberto Clemente was killed when his chartered DC-7
cargo plane crashed shortly after takeoff from Puerto Rico.1 "0
The plaintiffs alleged that FAA employees acted negligently
in failing to properly inspect the plane involved and in failing
to warn potential passengers that the plane was not airwor-
thy.10' In September 1972, the FAA had published an internal
order mandating certain inspections in an effort to discourage
specific kinds of unairworthy operations. The trial court held
that the order established a duty'02 and that its breach consti-
tuted negligence.10 3 On the issue of liability only, the trial
court found for the plaintiffs.'0 4
On appeal, the First Circuit focused on the existence of a
duty on the part of the FAA to inspect and to warn of
unairworthy aircraft.'06 The appellate court held that the in-
ternal order did not establish an actionable duty.1" Curiously,
although the appellate court did discuss a variety of air traffic
control cases involving the FAA, it did not mention prior cer-
tification/inspection cases discussed in this article.
B. United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States
The United Scottish case, which included two appellate de-
cisions identified here as United Scottish 1107 and United
" Id. at 187.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1965).
9 Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 429 F. Supp. at 187.
" 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
100 Clemente v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 564 (D.P.R. 1976).
101 Id. at 566-67.
101 Id. at 568.
1*1 Id. at 571.
10, Id. at 576.
'00 567 F.2d at 1143.
I" Id. at 1145.
207 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Scottish 1,108 revolves around the crash of a twin engine
DeHavelland Dove air taxi plane during a flight between Ne-
vada and California. Approximately three years prior to the
crash, the plane had been modified with the installation of a
gasoline-fueled cabin heater which had been installed in the
nose of the aircraft in front of the passenger compartment
and below the pilot's cockpit." 9 Pursuant to the applicable
law,110 the party installing the heater applied to the FAA for
an STC. During the flight the plane caught fire.' The plane
crashed, killing all four occupants.112 The plaintiffs" 3 alleged
and the trial judge found that an FAA employee, while in-
specting the heater installation, had negligently failed to de-
tect a defective condition in the installation."" The court fur-
ther found that the government issued the STC based upon
the negligently performed inspection and that the defect,
which should have been detected by the FAA inspector, was
the proximate cause of the crash." 5 Judgment was entered
against the United States."'
The United States appealed the judgment on several
grounds, '17 but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded on
,o 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982).
100 614 F.2d at 189-90. Most of the facts of the United Scottish case reported
herein can be found at 614 F.2d 188. Additional facts, for the reader's interest, are
provided by co-author, Joseph T. Cook, who represented the United States at the
first United Scottish trial and during the first appeal.
110 49 U.S.C. § 1423 (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1982).
"' United Scottish 1, 614 F.2d at 190.
" Id. at 189.
11 The plaintiffs included the widows and children of the co-pilot and one passen-
ger, and the children of a female passenger, all suing for wrongful death damages.
Additionally, the owner-operator of the plane sued for the value of the plane and loss
of its use, and the owner-operator's liability insurance carrier sued seeking to recover
indemnification for settlements made to the families of the passengers. Id.
.1. Id. at 190.
J1B Id.
I Id. at 189.
"7 Id. at 190. The government asserted (1) that the plaintiffs had not shown and
the court had not found a "private person" liability in any applicable state law to be
applied to the United States; (2) that violation of FARs by a government safety in-
spector is not a basis for liability under the FTCA; (3) that the misrepresentation
defense found at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976) precludes recovery; and (4) that the court
was clearly erroneous in its factual findings regarding the cause of the crash and the
owner-operator's contributory negligence. Id. at 190-91.
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a narrow basis.1 " The Ninth Circuit held that there had been
no showing during the trial and no determination by the trial
court as to how a private person would be liable under like
circumstances. "' The appellate court stated that because the
jurisdictional basis of the FTCA limits the government's lia-
bility to situations in which a private person under like cir-
cumstances can be held liable, a trial court must find and con-
clude that a private person can be held liable under like
circumstances. 20 The case was reversed and remanded for
further proceedings on that question.'"'
The trial re-opened, further evidence was presented, and
briefs were filed relative to the choice of law and the issues of
duty and breach of duty. Following that process, the trial
court again entered judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs
against the United States, holding that the good samaritan
doctrine, formulated in sections 323 and 324A of the Restate-
ment Second of Torts,""2 imposes a duty on a private person
under circumstances existing when the FAA inspector negli-
gently inspected the heater installation. 23 The case was again
appealed to the Ninth Circuit in United Scottish II.
During the second appeal, the United States asserted that
the circumstances required by the good samaritan doctrine
were not met in this particular case, that Congress never in-
tended the government to be liable for inspections conducted
by FAA personnel as part of the certification process, and that
two specific exceptions to the FTCA barred any liability.'2 4
The specific exceptions were the discretionary function excep-
tion'2M and the misrepresentation exception. '2 The Ninth Cir-
cuit decision in United Scottish II will be discussed with the
holding of the consolidated appeal of Varig Airlines v. United
118 Id. at 198.
119 Id. at 195.
1s Id. at 198.
"' Id.
See supra text accompanying note 53.
", United Scottish II, 692 F.2d 1209, 1210 (9th Cir. 1982).
114 Id. at 1211.
1,6 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of section 2680(a).
-,0 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of section 2680(h).
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States127 and Mascher v. United States'" in Section D.
C. Varig Airlines v. United States; Mascher v. United
States
A companion certification and inspection case was heard
and decided by the Ninth Circuit at the same time as United
Scottish II. The case was actually the consolidation of two
filings, Mascher and Varig, arising from the same aircrash.
The facts of Varig Airlines follow.""
In 1973, a Varig Airline flight crash landed in a field just
short of its destination. Post-accident investigation revealed
that a fire had broken out onboard the aircraft and that it had
spread with sufficient rapidity to force the crew to elect to
crash land rather than to try to reach the destination airport.
The crash landing was successful from a technical sense, and
the cockpit crew members escaped uninjured. The remaining
crew members and all but one of the passengers were killed,
not by crash forces, but by inhalation of toxic fumes and
smoke created by the inflight fire.130
A post-crash investigation revealed evidence suggesting that
the fire had started in the waste paper container located in
one of the aft lavatories on the plane. Examination of a pre-
sumably identical "sister" airplane in the Varig fleet revealed
a metal waste paper container that did not meet the fire con-
tainment standards.' 3' The civil air regulations that were in
M' No. 81-5366 (D. Cal. 1982).
No. 81-5366 (D. Cal 1982).
"' Most of the essential facts are contained in S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines) v. United States, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982). More de-
tailed information concerning the crash can be found in the Report of the Investiga-
tion Committee of the French Republic, as published in the Journal Officiel of the
Republic of France on April 6, 1976. A copy of the report is attached to the Mascher
plaintiff's memorandum in support of Varig's motion to strike affirmative defenses,
filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California in Civil
Action No. 79-0914-WPG on October 21, 1978. Additional background has been pro-
vided by co-author Joseph T. Cook, who was co-counsel with Robert R. Smiley for
the Mascher plaintiffs during the appeal.
13 692 F.2d at 1206-07.
'3' Id. at 1207. The metal waste paper container, which was supposed to be able to
"contain possible fires," had numerous holes drilled in it, apparently to accomodate
hydraulic lines, electrical wire bundles and plumbing. Id.
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effect at the time the plane was manufactured required, with
respect to cabin interiors, that "all receptacles for used towels,
papers, and waste shall be of fire-resistant material, and shall
incorporate covers or other provisions for containing possible
fires." 182
Varig and survivors of the deceased passengers sued the
United States alleging that when the airplane was originally
certified after manufacture, an FAA inspector had inspected
the waste container and had negligently authorized and ap-
proved its use, despite the obvious deficiencies which ren-
dered it incapable of containing possible fires. 133 The trial
court granted the motion of the United States for summary
judgment on the grounds that the FAA certification activities
did not come within the good samaritan doctrine and that
both the discretionary function and misrepresentation de-
fenses to the FTCA applied. 134
It is significant to note that in United Scottish I after a full
trial on the merits, the factfinder made a determination that
the government had been negligent in its inspection,' and
that in Varig Airlines, in granting the government's summary
judgment motion, the trial court assumed that the govern-
ment inspector had been negligent.131 The government thus
argued before the Ninth Circuit that damages caused by the
negligence of its employees should be uncompensated. The
Ninth Circuit, however, viewed the government's liability in a
different light.
D. Analysis of United Scottish II and Varig Airlines
In order to obtain maximum benefit from the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning, it must be remembered that United Scottish
H and Varig Airlines were consolidated for argument and
were decided by the same panel, with the decisions filed on
the same day. The two cases should be read together. The
132 Id. (citing Civil Air Regulations).
3 See, Varig Airlines, 692 F.2d at 1207.
"I Id. at 1206.
136 United Scottish I, 614 F.2d at 190.
136 Varig Airlines, 692 F.2d at 1207.
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government raised three principle defenses in both cases: (1)
absence of duty, (2) the misrepresentation defense, and (3)
the discretionary function defense. The two decisions address
the three issues differently. For ease of analysis, each issue
will be discussed separately with reference to the court's rea-
soning in United Scottish I, United Scottish II, and Varig
Airlines.
1. Absence of Duty
The initial question in suits against the United States for
negligent inspection of aircraft which leads to certification
arises in the context of the existence and the extent of any
duty owed by the United States to those suffering damages as
a result of a crash. In United Scottish I, the appellate court
held that if a private person would be liable for the negligent
inspection of an aircraft, then so would the United States.137
The court suggested, but did not hold, that if the state whose
law was to be applied followed sections 323 and 324A of the
Restatement Second of Torts as to the good samaritan doc-
trine and the facts on remand supported that doctrine, then
the United States would be liable. " 8
In the Varig Airlines decision, the Ninth Circuit reasserted
that the United States would be liable under the good samari-
tan doctrine, stating that if the United States negligently per-
formed a service, such as an inspection, that increased the risk
of injury to an injured person or caused the injured person to
rely on the proper performance of the service, liability would
attach.3 9 The court held that reliance of the traveling public
on FAA inspection is general knowledge. "1 0 Furthermore, the
court reasserted its prior position as set forth in Arney v.
United States"' that breach of Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARs) by the government can give rise to liability.
'37 United Scottish I, 614 F.2d at 198.
138 Id.
Varig Airlines, 692 F.2d at 1207.
Id 10. at 1208.
14- 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973). See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Arney v. United States.
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In United Scottish II, the court stated that the govern-
ment's claim that a regulatory duty was being performed,
rather than a service, had no merit.142 The Ninth Circuit dis-
posed of the government's reliance on Roberson v. United
States,"43 which had held that a government inspection was
not a-service to others, by pointing out that in Roberson the
government inspection was to protect the government's own
interest under a contract." By contrast, the inspection per-
formed on aircraft pursuant to certification under the CRFs is
not done for the self-interest of the United States. Rather, the
court stated that "the FAA's regulatory activities are per-
formed for the public as a whole. When voluntarily perform-
ing activities solely for the public, the FAA performs a service
for others.""'
On remand, following United Scottish I, the trial court, in
addressing the good samaritan doctrine, did not hold that the
service performed by the United States increased the risk of
harm to the plaintiffs. Rather, the trial court held that the
plaintiffs had relied upon the proper performance of the ser-
vice and that, therefore, section 323(b) of the Restatement
Second of Torts applied."' The United States took issue with
the trial court's holding, citing the case of Clemente v. United
States."47 Using the Varig Airlines case as a vehicle, the court
distinguished Clemente. In Clemente, the First Circuit held
that because the FAA directive relating to the negligently per-
formed inspection was internal in nature, no indication ex-
isted that anyone had ever relied upon it."5 By contrast, the
civil air regulations for waste receptacles (Varig Airlines) and
for appropriate structural supports for fuel lines in aircraft
(United Scottish) are national in scope and are mandated by
federal statute. Section 1421 of Title 49 of the United States
"I' United Scottish I1, 692 F.2d at 1211.
143 382 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967).
" United Scottish 11, 692 F.2d at 1211.
Id. at 1211.
116 United Scottish Ins. v. United States, No. 71-136-E, slip op. at 8-9 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 24, 1980).
M 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
"0' 567 F.2d at 1145.
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Code requires that the FAA conduct a comprehensive inspec-
tion for compliance with all safety regulations prior to the is-
suance of an airworthiness certificate.
149
The Varig Airlines court further noted that "49 U.S.C. 1301
... requires the FAA 'to promote safety of flight of civil air-
craft in air commerce and to perform its 'duties in such man-
ner as will best tend to reduce or eliminate the possibility, or
recurrence of accidents in air transportation . . . . , 15 Given
that statutory background, and the underlying specific regula-
tions regarding the design and the manufacture of aircraft,
the Ninth Circuit held that "[there is general knowledge...
that regulations designed ... [for] safety exist and that the
United States inspects ... aircraft for compliance .... The
United States should expect that members of the public will
rely on the proper performance by the FAA of its duty to in-
spect and certify."'15' In affirming the trial court's decision in
United Scottish II, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[h]aving
chosen to make aircraft safety inspections and to certify the
results, the government reasonably could expect that mem-
bers of the public would rely on the government's certification
of airworthiness. The careful performance of aircraft inspec-
tions is the essence of the government's duty, once the inspec-
tions are undertaken.' ' 5 2 In sum, United Scottish I, United
Scottish II, and Varig Airlines clearly hold that the United
States can be liable under the good samaritan doctrine for the
negligent inspection of aircraft pursuant to a certification pro-
gram because the inspection is a "service" and because the
flying public reasonably relies on those inspections.
In a last bid to avoid inevitable liability, the United States
contended throughout its argument before the Ninth Circuit
in both Varig Airlines and United Scottish H that if the
United States were to come under the good samaritan doc-
trine in certification cases, it would be liable for every acci-
149 Varig Airlines, 692 F.2d at 1208.
IsO Id.
151 Id.
's' United Scottish H, 692 F.2d at 1211.
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dent resulting from regulated activity." 3 The government ar-
gued, in effect, that it would become an insurer of safety. The
Ninth Circuit disposed of the argument, holding that "[tihe
United States will be liable only when injury has resulted
from the negligent performance of its duty. The voluntary as-
sumption of the inspection and certification function carries
with it the duty to inspect and certify with reasonable
care. "154
2. Misrepresentation Defense
The next issue raised by the government in its defense was
the misrepresentation exception." The government, in es-
sence, claimed that the plaintiffs' action was for the misrepre-
sentation of an unairworthy airplane as airworthy, through
the device of an airworthiness certificate. In both Varig Air-
lines and United Scottish II, the Ninth Circuit briefly dis-
missed this argument. In United Scottish H, specifically, the
court stated that "[tIhe basis of the plaintiff's claim ... is not
the misrepresentation or misinformation contained in the cer-
tificate, but the negligence of the FAA's inspection on which
the airworthiness certificate was issued.
1 56
3. Discretionary Function Defense
The last line of defense taken by the United States in these
certification cases was the universally used and often abused
15 Varig Airlines, 692 F.2d at 1208.
154 Id.
,11 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of section 2680(h).
,' United Scottish I, 692 F.2d 1211. Interestingly, the court did not cite or rely
upon two Ninth Circuit cases which, it is believed, would have provided another
sound foundation for the rejection of the government's misrepresentation defense.
Both Green v. United States, 629 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1980) and Ramirez v. United
States, 567 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1977) stand for the proposition that the government's
misrepresentation defense applies only to commercial transactions, and cannot be
used by the government in cases resulting from personal injury or wrongful death.
See also United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 711 n.26 (1961). The holdings of
United Scottish IH and Mascher and Varig would deny the misrepresentation defense
to the United States for both commercial losses and personal injury losses, and is
thus more broad. The court's dismissal of the United States misrepresentation argu-
ment in Mascher and Varig can be found in 692 F.2d at 1208.
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discretionary function defense.157 Again, the position taken by
the United States was rejected. In United Scottish II as well
as in Varig Airlines, the court pointed out that the discretion-
ary function defense is intended to provide protection to gov-
ernment activities in the areas of plans, policy, judgment, and
decision making. " 8 The court was of the opinion that inspect-
ing aircraft for compliance with regulations, however, is not
the kind of activity that relies upon policy choices or deci-
sions. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the inspection did not
fall within the coverage of the discretionary function defense.
In United Scottish H the court further stated that "[a]ll air-
craft must comply with FAA requirements in order to be cer-
tified as airworthy and thereafter placed in operation. FAA
officials enforce the requirements by inspecting the aircraft,
but cannot in any way change or waive safety require-
ments." ' In Varig Airlines the court also stated that "[a]
proper inspection will discover facts. The facts will show ei-
ther compliance or noncompliance. Aircraft must comply with
the regulations in order to be certified."'
60
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's handling of the discre-
tionary function defense in both United Scottish II and Varig
Airlines the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a summary judg-
ment in favor of the United States in the case of Garbarino v.
United States."' In Gabarino, however, the plaintiff's allega-
tions regarding negligent inspection and certification were
limited to a claim that the FAA had failed to enact adequate
regulations to ensure crashworthiness. 162 The Sixth Circuit
held that the discretionary function defense protects the
United States from liablity when charged with failure to pro-
mulgate adequate safety regulations.'" s It seems clear that the
discretionary function defense is proper in the face of such
allegations and that the Sixth Circuit's decision is not at odds
-5, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
" Varig Airlines, 692 F.2d at 1208-09; United Scottish H, 692 F.2d at 1212.
" United Scottish H, 692 F.2d at 1212.
1o Varig Airlines, 692 F.2d at 1209.
"1 666 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1981).
16 Id. at 1065.
1o3 Id.
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with the Ninth Circuit's holdings in United Scottish H and
Varig Airlines.164
IV. CONCLUSION
By combining the effects of Clemente,6 Garbarino,"11
United Scottish I,167 United Scottish II,6s and Varig Air-
lines, 69 it can reasonably be stated that a cause of action can
be asserted against the United States under the FTCA for
negligent inspection leading to certification if the following oc-
cur: (1) The plaintiff alleges that the cause of the crash was a
defect in the plane that was a violation of publicly dissemi-
nated and objectively measurable or determinable government
standards or regulations; 17 0 (2) The plaintiff alleges that the
injured parties reasonably relied upon the FAA to inspect the
aircraft in question, pursuant to the administrator's obligation
under the Federal Aviation Act;17 1 (3) The plaintiff alleges
that the defect in the airplane was contrary to the objectively
determinable or measurable regulation or standard, and was
the cause of his injury; and (4) The plaintiff alleges that the
failure to detect the defect resulted from negligent perform-
ance of an actual inspection of the airplane by an FAA em-
ployee in the course of his duties.
Care should be taken not to allege: (1) That the regulations
were insufficient or non-existent;"" (2) That the regulations in
question were internal or in any way not the subject of "pub-
lic or common knowledge '178 (3) That the plaintiff's (or plain-
tiff's decedent's) reliance was on an airworthiness certificate
"I On May 16, 1983 the Supreme Court granted the United States' petition for a
writ of certiorari in both United Scottish II and Varig Airlines. 103 S.Ct. 2084
(1983). The questions presented are the duty question, the applicability of the discre-
tionary function defense, and the applicability of the misrepresentation defense.
45 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
186 666 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1981).
167 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
1" 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982).
69 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982).
170 See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
'7 See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
'73 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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or other document as contrasted with an actual physical in-
spection of the plane by an FAA employee.As a practical matter, the above limitations pose a signifi-
cant pleading problem for a plaintiff in a negligent inspection
case. Such a circumstance, however, is not contrary to the in-
tent of Congress in passing the FTCA. Furthermore, by nar-
rowing the scope of potential liability, the consequences of
limitless liability and the government-as-insurer envisioned by
the Sixth Circuit in Garbarino and the First Circuit in Cle-
mente are greatly lessened. Policy grounds can no longer serve
as a justification for denying liability.
As a final point, it is interesting to note the brief concurring
opinion filed in United Scottish II by Judge Richard Cham-
bers. Judge Chambers wrote "[m]ost of us thought when the
Federal Tort Claims Act was passed, that the discretionary
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act would preclude re-
covery on the facts of the two cases we decided today, but the
developing law seems to have overtaken us. Thus, I concur.M7 4
That statement sets forth the reality and the essence of our
common law system which allows and indeed thrives upon de-
velopment of the law in accordance with changing circum-
stances in society. The enormous reliance on air travel today,
combined with the fact that the vast majority of commercial
aircraft are built in the United States and inspected and cer-
tificated by the FAA, are ample reason for the flying public to
rely upon the FAA for inspection and for enforcement of com-
pliance with minimum standards required by the CFRs. It is
only when an FAA employee is negligent in performing such
an inspection and those who relied upon him are injured that
the United States will be liable to compensate the injured.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken a step
forward for air safety. The development of the law relating to
negligent inspection resulting in certification will be most in-
teresting to follow.
" United Scottish H, 692 F.2d at 1212.
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